Wednesday, July 8, 2015

A Horizon, Not a Line



In the wake of the 2012 Presidential Election, there was much clammer about prospect of immigration reform. February came to reveal a policy proposal by the newly reelected Obama Administration, in the form of an “anonymous” leak to the media about the desired direction of the White House towards immigration reform. Amongst the proposed package is an attempt to deal with those individuals who are living in the United States illegally. Qualified undocumented residents would be eligible for a green card within a waiting period of eight years (Hesson, 2013, ABC News).  Due to the fact that 56% of Mexican immigration is undocumented and that Mexico accounts for 34% of immigration to the United States (Hanson, 2006), this policy will be of great concern to U.S/Mexican relations. The aim of this paper should be seen as a creative addendum to the policy proposed by President Obama’s White House. Vital to understanding this policy, however, requires an understanding of the economic and historical dynamics of American immigration policy towards Mexico. Also, rhetorical frameworks around this issue shall be reexamined, such as the abolition of the “guest worker” and a new definition of a secure border. In doing all this, hopefully harmony shall be attained.
Immigration policy in the southwestern United States has historically has been geared wholly towards the needs of American industry, with brief interludes of bowing towards momentary populist fervor, but policy never fully addressed the needs of the migrant. During the nineteenth century, much if the southwest labor was filled by migrant Chinese contract laborers in an early form of a guest worker program.  This allowed for companies to treat their migrant workers with little regard. In the early 1880’s, however, the political tides shifted towards nativists’ policies. The Chinese Exclusion Act made it illegal to import contract laborers in an effort to quell the numbers of Chinese immigrants (Gilmore, 1963). By the time this law was passed, the southwest had built so the need for the Chinese migrant had been exhausted. Certain states, like California, now faced a need for low skilled agricultural labor, and looked to places like Mexico, Canada, and Cuba to fill the void. Between 1901 and 1924, a time of great agricultural growth, saw California enact several exemptions from the tax code for such legal migrant workers (Gilmore, 1963). However, as the Depression took hold of the American economy, Nativism ruled the day again as “At least 345,839 people went to Mexico from 1930 to 1935, with 1931 as the peak year, says a 1936 dispatch from the U.S. Consulate General in Mexico City”, (Koch, 2006, USA TODAY). These numbers unfortunately do not express how many American-born Mexican families were unduly deported in what was dubbed “repatriation.” In 1951, Public Law 78 established the Bracero program. This brought migrant farm workers from rural Mexico to do seasonal agricultural jobs (Gilmore, 1963). Many experienced grueling conditions in such labor, and treated as if they were disposable. This is to be expected when you consider the translation of the word Bracero from Spanish, it means, a person who  “works with his arms.” To the Agricultural Industry these people were not even migrants; they were merely a pair of arms for labor.  The discontinuing of the Bracero program in 1964 did not cease the flow of immigration from Mexico, nor would it be the last time America’s economic situation spurred Mexican migration.

Economic conditions in the United States and general proximity have long been the draw  of the Mexican immigrant, though citizenship has never been considered a forgone conclusion for this group.  Free trade agreements were presented as a market based solution to Mexican poverty and unemployment; however, it seemed to have the opposite effect. Within the first eight years of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) manufacturing wages slid 11% while productivity grew by 50% (Cavanaugh, 2002).  Worse yet, the American-owned factories in Mexico forbade the formation of a union, and protest was discouraged by police force (Cavanaugh, 2002). The NAFTA treaty had equally devastating effects on the agricultural industry of Mexico with the arrival of corn from the US. Between 1994 and 1998 the poverty rate grew in rural Mexico by four points from 78% to 82 %,  (Cavanaugh, 2002). The large differential in wages, combined with stagnant policies involving visas from the United States, incentivizes illegal immigration from Mexico (Hanson, 2006). Because of the established routes of communication on either side of the border, migration from Mexico can respond with little time delay, to the low skilled labor market of the American economy. It could have been put in to the NAFTA negotiations some sort of residency clause, but from research it is apparent that both camps failed to predict free trade’s stimulation of immigration. 
            
As is shown, America’s economy necessitates migration by its free market pursuit of low skilled labor. This is not to imply a sense of conspiracy, but this fact should implore the United States government to make a more reasonable accommodation. Instead of having a quota system based callously on labor statistics, it should be based on the actual number of actual people migrating to the United States. Rather than forcing a law abiding undocumented migrant to wait eight years for a green card, why not issue the green card to initiate a four year waiting period for actual citizenship. Critics of this policy would say that we can’t allow for those who came here illegally to cut to the front of the line of all those who came here legally. If this is reexamined, however, we can imagine a horizon and not a line, and thus reap what we have sown south of the border.  In reality, granting citizenship to an undocumented resident in no way impedes the ability of another immigrant to attain legal citizenship as the State Department distributes a set, self-determined number of available visas on a country to country basis.
Opponents of the President’s proposals like Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) lament,  "The President's bill repeats the failures of past legislation," Rubio said. "It fails to follow through on previously broken promises to secure our borders, creates a special pathway that puts those who broke our immigration laws at an advantage over those who chose to do things the right way and come here legally, and does nothing to address guest workers or future flow, which serious immigration experts agree is critical to preventing future influxes of illegal immigrants." (Hesson, 2013, ABC News).   The problem with this criticism is that there is no historical precedent for a successful legislative attempt to prevent legal or illegal migration from Mexico, and in fact the Chinese Exclusion Act created the labor conditions for informal border crossings! 
            There is a way to document these migrants as they cross, which would no longer make them rule breakers. If the Border Patrol or Customs set up offices linked to Mexican databases on the border at known points of heavy crossing, those seeking a better economic opportunity can be started on that path. They would be given a green card, which would begin a four-year waiting process for citizenship. Also, applicants would be required to find a job within 60 days of checking in at these border posts. This would allow people to bring their families with them that are each stimulus for the American economy. The only reason someone could oppose this would be that they see it a more advantageous dynamic to keep the vulnerable voices behind a curtain technical criminality.  With citizenship, these workers could attain union membership and receive better wages, since their dependants were brought here legally; this reduces the likelihood of remitinance income being sent out of the US (Hansen, 2006).
            Immigration has always been a pressing and percolating debate in the United States. In our trade deals with our neighbors in Central and South America, the United States pursues the most winning deal for our economy, sometimes at peril of the rural Mexican.    If there is the capacity to do this and have it implemented, some responsibility must be accepted on the part of the United States to accommodate those most affected by these deals. Globalization has made the world too interconnected to treat such people as only labor to produce profit, but rather as people with individual needs. People traveling to this country in search of a better life have never proven to be a detriment to society. Just ask those who market Italian food or those who operate Irish pubs. It is possible to be both accountable and understanding of the plight of those beyond our borders if there is a will to pursue policy of that direction.
  


















Debate: Happily Ever NAFTA?
John spi, Sarah Anderson, Jaime Serra and J. Enrique Espinosa
Foreign Policy , No. 132 (Sep. - Oct., 2002), pp. 58-65

The Bracero in California
N. Ray Gilmore and Gladys W. Gilmore
Pacific Historical Review , Vol. 32, No. 3 (Aug., 1963), pp. 265-282
Article DOI: 10.2307/4492181
Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4492181

Borders for Whom? The Role of NAFTA in Mexico-U.S. Migration
Patricia Fernández-Kelly and Douglas S. Massey
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science , Vol. 610, NAFTA and Beyond: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Global Trade and Development (Mar., 2007), pp. 98-118

Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States
Gordon H. Hanson
Journal of Economic Literature , Vol. 44, No. 4 (Dec., 2006), pp. 869-924
Leaked White House Immigration Bill Puts Pressure on Senate
Ted Hesson
Feb. 17 2013

Understanding America's Immigration "Crisis"
Douglas S. Massey
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society , Vol. 151, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 309-327